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ABSTRACT 
Stopping a ship commandeered and used as a weapon to attack shore 
infrastructure in the Strait of Malacca is a challenging problem. The purpose of this thesis 
is to determine systems that constitute architectures of an SoS to stop oil tanker that is 
hijacked with the intention of running into the oil terminal on Jurong Island, Singapore. 
In addition, this research aims at laying a sound systems engineering foundation for 
addressing this problem. The approach primarily leverages the System of Systems 
Architecture Development Process (SoSADP) [1]. Systems to stop hijacked merchant 
vessels or ships used as weapons (SAW) are investigated. This thesis shows that there are 
means to stop a SAW. These include existing and postulated systems that warrant further 
consideration and study for inclusion into Singapore’s Maritime Domain Protection 
(MDP) architecture. The results of the research cited in this thesis have potential MDP 
applications around the world and can serve as tools for decision makers in future SAW 
and MDP analysis. All products in this thesis can be expanded in the future as part of the 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Terrorists have demonstrated their intent and capability to execute attacks on oil 
related infrastructure. Singapore is considered an attractive target for such attacks, 
because a successful attack interrupting its extremely high throughput of oil flow of oil 
would certainly disrupt world oil markets and because the high traffic density of 
merchant ships transiting the Straits of Malacca and Singapore afford terrorists the 
opportunity to run a commandeered large merchant vessel into on oil related 
infrastructure.  
This type of threat, known as a ship used as a weapon (SAW), was addressed in 
Maritime Domain Protection in the Straits of Malacca [2] by NPS’s Systems Engineering 
and Analysis (SEA) Cohort 7 (SEA-7) in June 2005 and in Maritime Threat Response [3] 
by SEA-9 in June 2006. SEA-7 focused on an SoS for cargo container inspections and a 
total maritime inspection subsystem to detect and identify dangerous materials [2]. SEA-
9 focused on an SoS to respond to maritime threats such as weapon of mass destructive 
on a ship, a SAW, and small boat attacks in San Francisco Bay [3]. Recently, the 
Temasek Defence Systems Institute (TDSI) raised this SAW problem at the TDSI-NPS 
conferences June 2007 and sought its solutions [4]. 
This thesis examines the modes-of-defeat for a SAW and develops conceptual 
systems, concepts, or methods as part of an family of systems (FoS) that can be employed 
in a system of systems SoS to stop an oil tanker used as a weapon before it can collide 
with the Jurong Oil Terminal in Singapore Harbor. The SoS is designated as the anti-
SAW (ASAW) SoS. A Design Reference Mission [5] analysis indicates that the largest 
oil tanker registered with Singapore traveling at 25 kts  is used as a SAW. 
The approach to determining architecture alternatives of the ASAW SoS 
leverages the System of Systems Architecture Development Process (SoSADP) [1]. It is 
set in motion by the SAW problem and ends with architecture alternatives of the ASAW 




have one function in common – that is stop a SAW, and they can be current and future 
systems and concepts. As the C3 structure remains fixed for all SoS architecture 
alternatives, the focus of this thesis is on the members of the FoS.  
Since the mission of the ASAW SoS is to stop the SAW and to stop it as early and 
distant from Singapore as possible, the probability of mission kill, KP , is the Measure of 
Effectiveness (MOE). The time from confirmation of a SAW to the time of mission 
kill, KT , and the distance along its projected track from the Jurong Oil Terminal to the 
location where the SAW mission kill occurs, KD , are the Measures of Performance 
(MOP) characterizing how well the mission kill is achieved. 
The members of the FoS carry out these functions: Interrupt Air Flow, Degrade 
Personnel, Degrade Visibility, Impede Motion, Change Buoyancy, and Impede Steering. 
Interruption of the air flow of a SAW means to deny air for combustion to ships or to 
clog exhaust ducts. Degrading personnel refers to subduing or eliminating the 
commandeering terrorists. Degrading visibility refers to diminishing the line-of-sight 
visibility of the human eye. Changing buoyancy pertains to decreasing the “effective 
buoyancy” of the ocean water. Impeding steering pertains to denying a ship its ability to 
steer by applying sufficient counter torque or physical degradation of the rudder.  
The resulting ASAW SoS architecture alternatives have both existing and 
postulated systems in the FoS. The existing systems include Sea Marshals, warships, 
aircraft, tugs, physical barriers, and artificial obscurants. Sea Marshals perform Degrade 
Personnel. Warships, waterborne vessels designed for military or law enforcement 
purposes, can perform many different functions as part of a larger ASAW system such as 
Interrupt Air Flow, Degrade Personnel, Impede Motion, Change Buoyancy, and Impede 
Steering. Tugs would carry out Impede Motion and Impede Steering, but traditional 
working tugs may not have the required speed. Similar to warships, fixed wing and rotary 
aircraft can provide many different functions such as Interrupt Air Flow, Degrade 
Personnel, Impede Motion, Change Buoyancy, and Impede Steering. A large-scale 
physical barrier could carry out Impede Motion by blocking the approaches to Singapore. 
Artificial obscurants can perform Reduce Visibility to reduce visibility of the approaches 
to Singapore.  
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Postulated systems, which tend to have a low TRL, exist only as concepts or 
require major modifications or development before they can perform the ASAW or any 
other MDP mission. The postulated systems are standing water waves, bubbling system, 
UUV, and air flow interrupter. A standing water wave that can be generated to deflect or 
redirect a waterborne craft base can perform Impede Motion and Impede Steering. An 
array of pipes or some other mechanisms to create rising gas bubbles could perform 
Change Buoyancy by reducing the density of the seawater. Unmanned Underwater 
Vehicles (UUV) could perform Impede Motion or Impede Steering by fouling the 
propeller or steering gear. Finally, an air flow interrupter possibly delivered by a guided 
means could perform Impede Motion by deny sufficient main engine air intake or 
exhaust. 
Different combinations of the existing and postulated systems generate the 
architecture options where each unique combination constitutes an option. Existing and 
postulated architecture options are ranked separately but postulated options include 
existing systems. Option rankings are based on the technology and performance risks for 
their respective component systems. The resulting rankings are not an absolute order of 
priority but are a basis for formulating courses of action in ASAW SoS development.  
The results generated by the SoSADP in this thesis can be applied not only to the 
ASAW mission problem but also to other MDP missions. Whereas the setting of the 
ASAW scenario is Singapore, the methods and solutions formulated in this thesis could 
apply to other crucial ports and shorelines around the world. Employing these solutions 
could negate such an attack, thereby protecting critical coastal infrastructure. Providing 
this protection would help maintain economic and political stability.  
There is potential for near-term improvement of the existing options. It is 
recommended that continued analysis be conducted for high speed tugs, barriers, and 
obscurants for evaluating their integration into the current MDP SoS. Further analysis is 
also required and suggested for the postulated options. By their nature, postulated 




strongly recommended on existing and postulated systems for any nation where a SAW 
has been determined to be a significant threat. Finally, any future studies should extend 
beyond the SAW problem and include the overall MDP mission. 
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Terrorists are continuously looking for new ways to garner attention and wreak 
havoc on the United States and western civilization. It has long been known that 
disruption of the oil industry is an effective means to hinder the countries that depend 
heavily on oil products. After the first Gulf War, oil wells were set ablaze causing 
environmental damage and economic disruption in the commodities markets. Currently, 
the threat of land based attacks on oil infrastructure continues as evident by attacks in 
Iraq and the Russo-Georgian conflict. Although difficult to achieve, waterborne attacks 
are also being used. In 2002, a French oil tanker was attacked resulting in the spillage of 
90,000 barrels of oil. [6] 
In 2004, recognizing the effectiveness of interrupting oil flow within the world 
markets, Osama bin Laden openly called for attacks on the oil industry in Iraq. The stated 
purpose of this strategy was to inflict economic damage upon the United States. In the 
following year, Ayman al-Zawahiri echoed bin Laden’s call on an international level. In 
December 2005, al-Qaeda attacked a large oil refinery in Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia. [7]  
Terrorist have demonstrated that they have the intent and capability to execute 
attacks on oil related infrastructure. It is therefore important to consider oil infrastructure 
when examining critical infrastructure protection. One location warranting attention is 
Singapore and its associated oil infrastructure.  
Singapore is considered susceptible to such attacks for several reasons. First and 
foremost, it has an extremely high throughput of oil, and a successful attack interrupting 
this flow of oil would certainly disrupt world oil markets. Second, such a disruption, even 
if temporary, would provide the publicity that terrorists desire. Also, the high traffic 
density of merchant ships transiting the Straits of Malacca and Singapore afford terrorists 
the opportunity to hijack a large merchant vessel and use it as a SAW.  
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As pirates have shown they can overtake ships in the Strait of Malacca, and 
terrorists can successfully plan major attacks like those in New York, Madrid, and 
London, it is reasonable to expect or conclude that terrorists are capable of 
commandeering a cargo ship and using it as a weapon. Authorities in Singapore and the 
United States acknowledged this threat, which was addressed in Maritime Domain 
Protection in the Straits of Malacca [2], by NPS’s Systems Engineering and Analysis 
(SEA) Cohort 7 (SEA-7) in June 2005 and in Maritime Threat Response [3] by SEA-9 in 
June 2006. SEA-7 focused on an SoS for cargo container inspections and a total maritime 
inspection subsystem to detect and identify dangerous materials [2]. SEA-9 focused on an 
SoS to respond to maritime threats such as WMD on a ship, a SAW, and small boat 
attacks in San Francisco Bay [3]. 
The Temasek Defence Systems Institute (TDSI) continues to raise this problem at 
the TDSI-NPS conferences June 2007 and seeks solutions [4]. This thesis attempts to 
provide solutions and facilitate further study on precisely how to stop a SAW. 
Additionally, maritime inspection, cost-effectiveness, national response are not within the 
scope of this work. Solutions to stop a ship as a SAW are investigated. The objectives of 
this work are to lay a solid systems engineering foundation for addressing the SAW 
problem and to include the initial research and analysis necessary to develop methods 
specifically to stop a hijacked oil tanker with the intention of running into the oil terminal 
on Jurong Island, Singapore. The goal of this thesis is to investigate methods to deal with 
such a threat.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This thesis examines the modes-of-defeat for a SAW and develops conceptual 
systems, concepts, or methods as part of an FoS that can be employed in a SoS to counter 
a SAW in Singapore. Again, Singapore serves as the setting for this study. A cargo ship 
in the vicinity of Singapore is assumed to have the intention of colliding with Jurong Oil 




The approach to determining those methods or systems primarily leverages the 
System of Systems Architecture Development Process (SoSADP) depicted in Figure 1 [1].  
 
Figure 1.   The layered structure of the SoSADP (From: [1]) 
1.  System of Systems Engineering Methodology 
Systems of Systems (SoS) Engineering involves taking an SoS engineering 
problem and formulating solution systems of systems that consist of current and future 
systems. The main motive for having an SoS over a monolithic stand-alone system is to 
achieve capabilities that cannot be achieved by individual stand-alone systems. One 
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major contrast between an SoS and a monolithic system is that the loss of one or more 
systems constituting an SoS does not necessarily mean the SoS completely loses its 
capability, whereas a system losing one of its components will likely experience major 
degradation in capability. Since the purpose of the SoS treated in this thesis is to counter 
a SAW, it is designated as the anti-SAW (ASAW) SoS. 
The SoSADP is a systems engineering process used to arrive at SoSs employed to 
stop a SAW. It is a layered process in which the processes of a layer provide input to the 
layer above it, as shown in Figure 1. As a framework for analyzing solutions to the SAW 
problem, the SoSADP starts with the problem of stopping a SAW and ends with 
architectures of SoS to carry out the ASAW mission. The systems of an ASAW SoS will 
be drawn from a family of systems (FOS). The members of this FoS have one function in 
common – that is stop a SAW. They can be current and future systems and concepts. An 
ASAW SoS composed by the elements of this FoS will not materialize unless they have 
the capability to stop a SAW. The focus of this thesis thus will be on the members of the 
FoS.  
2.  SoS Problem 
The SoS problem is to stop a SAW before it can achieve its mission. Specifically, 
the problem is to stop an oil tanker used as a SAW before it can collide with the Jurong 
Oil Terminal in Singapore. This problem statement sets in motion the SoSADP. 
3. Mission Analysis  
Mission analysis is comprised primarily of the Design Reference Mission (DRM). 
The process for DRM development is based on Laying the Foundation for Successful 
Systems Engineering [5]. The philosophies and practices in [5] are used by the U.S. Navy 
in various acquisition programs are used in this work.  
The DRM provides the basis for all subsequent systems engineering activities and 
is viewed as a living document that matures with iterations in the systems engineering 
process [5]. The DRM formally establishes the anticipated threat and operating  
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environment and captures the Determine Threats, Define Scenarios, and Define Missions 
processes within the Mission Analysis layer of the SoSADP. Additionally, the DRM 
defines scenarios and missions via Operational Situations (OPSIT).  
4. Needs Analysis 
After Mission Analysis, the process continues with Analyze SoS Needs. The 
SoSADP determines what the SoS must do to complete its purpose – to stop a SAW 
within the context of the DRM. It is the results of the Needs Analysis that generate the 
requirements for an ASAW SoS.  
Technical Measures (TM) are generated based on guidance provided in Technical 
Measurement [8] and concepts from The Fundamentals of Aircraft Combat Survivability 
[9]. Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) are selected from the TMs.  
5. Requirements Analysis 
The established needs support the Requirements Analysis layer in which the 
requirements and Measures of Performance (MOP) are developed. Since this work 
focuses on the means to stop a SAW, the Requirements Analysis layer primarily 
addresses functional requirements of the FoS [1]. The SoS is to consist of the systems of 
the FoS that satisfy one or more of the functional requirements to stop the SAW.  
6. SoS Architecture Alternatives 
The SoS Architecture Alternatives are solution sets to be considered for solving 
the SAW problem. They are derived from Postulate Future Systems and Identify Existing 
Systems within the context of the input from Requirements Analysis. Communications 
Structures and Command and Control Structures are subsumed into one Command, 
Control, and Communications (C3) Structure and are assumed satisfactory and constant 
for each SoS architecture alternative. An in-depth analysis of C3 is not within the scope 
of this thesis. The FoS provides different combinations of systems, which, together with 
an invariant C3 structure constitute alternative SoSs.  
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7. Risk Analysis 
The Cost and Risk Analysis layer of the SoSADP is confined to Risk Analysis. 
The cost of various architecture alternatives is not examined because it does not affect the 
methods for stopping a SAW. The functionality and performance of an FoS is of primary 
concern; cost is not within the scope of this thesis. 
Risk Analysis is limited to identifying Technology Risk as it relates to each 
system in the FoS and Operational Risk within the CONOPS. Identification of 
Technology Risk is achieved by applying Hardware Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 
definitions from the DoD Technology Readiness Assessment Deskbook [10].  
8. SoS Architecture Ranking 
Perform Modeling and Simulation is not within the scope of this thesis. The SoS 
Architecture Ranking is achieved by comparing and contrasting the TMs associated with 
each architecture alternative to the fullest extent possible. Since the work in this thesis 
conceptual and is considered as a first iteration of the SoSADP, quantifying all TMs is 
challenging and not always possible. Reasonable assumptions and estimations are made 
to facilitate the analysis and, ultimately, the ranking of the SoS architectures and 
recommendations.  
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II. MISSION ANALYSIS 
A. BACKGROUND 
In the SoSADP, Mission Analysis is realized by Determine Threats, Determine 
Missions, and Define Scenarios. In this thesis, Mission Analysis and its component 
processes are achieved via a DRM. A DRM defines the threat and the operational 
environment in which the threat exists. Also, the DRM establishes the basis for 
subsequent systems engineering activities, particularly generating requirements, refining 
problem definition, developing concepts, analyzing alternatives, and testing and 
evaluation. In creating a DRM, the primary objective is to describe the threat and 
environment sufficiently. Identification of the solution is conducted as part of the 
SoSADP in later processes. A well-developed DRM facilitates the generation of 
requirements and subsequent system design, e.g., the system must operate within the 
environmental extremes. The construction of this DRM follows Laying the Foundation 
for Successful Systems Engineering [5], the philosophy and practices espoused in which 
are used by the U.S. Navy in various acquisition programs. 
B. DRM: OPERATING ENVIRONMENT 
1. Geography 
The setting of this study is the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and the nautical 
approaches to Singapore. Figure 2 shows the Straits of Malacca and Singapore where the 
Andaman Sea is north-west of the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea is to the 
east of the Strait of Singapore. Figure 3 shows Singapore and its nautical approaches. The 
nautical approaches are waterways such as straits, channels, harbors, and traffic 
separation schemes that allow for waterborne access to Singapore. 
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Figure 2.   Map of Straits of Malacca and Singapore (After: [11]) 
 
Figure 3.   Map of Singapore and its approaches (After: [11]) 
2.  Maritime Conditions 
Unlike the English Channel, the maritime conditions are comparatively benign. 
Although the seas and harbor can become choppy, they typically do not experience 
significant swells. Surface water temperature is also relatively stable throughout the year 
varying approximately 11oF between day-night extremes. However, currents can reach up 
to 4.0  kts in the straits. This is comparable to the Gulf Stream, one of the larger open 
ocean currents. Table 1 summarizes the maritime conditions in the vicinity of Singapore. 
Strait 
  of 
  Malacca 
Strait of Singapore 
Strait of Singapore 
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Table 1.   Summary of maritime conditions (From: [2], [12], [13]) 
Maritime Parameter Maritime Condition 
Sea State  Straits of Malacca and Singapore 1-2, 3(max) 
Water Temperature Day 88
oF 
Night 79oF 
Currents Straits of Malacca and Singapore 4.0  kts (max)  
Tides Mean High Water 2.0 2.9 m−  
Mean Low Water 0.4 1.2 m−  
3.  Climate and Meteorological Conditions  
The climate is described as: equatorial, hot, humid and rainy. Appendix A 
provides complete climatology directly from Singapore’s National Environment Agency 
[14]. Monsoons occur from November to March and June to September. Thunderstorms 
occur on 40% of the days throughout the year [14]. Table 2 provides a summary of 
meteorological conditions. 
Table 2.   Summary of meteorological conditions (From: [14], [2]) 
Meteorological Parameter Meteorological Condition 
Temperature 
Average Maximum 88 - 93oF 
Average Minimum 73 - 79oF 
Extremes 67 - 101oF 
Pressure 
Extremes 1002.0 - 1016.9 hPa 
Diurnal Variation 4 hPa 
Winds 
Mean Surface 12 mph 
December - April from south-east 
June - October from north-west 
Relative Humidity Mean 84% 
Diurnal Range 60 - 98% 
Precipitation Average Annual Rainfall 92.8 inches 
Ducting ( for > 3GHz) Surface Ducting 15 - 20% of the time 
Evaporation Ducting Continuous 
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C. DRM: POTENTIAL TARGETS  
Due to its high volume of oil throughput, the Oil Tanking Odfjell Terminal on 
Jurong Island, Singapore, shown in Figure 4, is selected as the target for this DRM. 
Several terminals exist in Singapore. Among the terminals in Singapore, Odfjell Terminal 
is chosen to be a high value target for terrorists because of its potential environmental 
disaster and disruption of all shipping in Singapore. 
  
Figure 4.   Map of Jurong Island and Oil Tanking Odfjell Terminal (After: [11]) 
D. DRM: THREAT CHARACTERISTICS  
Again, the specific threat is defined an oil tanker commandeered by terrorists and 
used as a weapon. This section describes oil tankers in general and those specifically 
registered in Singapore. The term “oil tanker” applies to any vessel transporting large 
quantities of crude oil, refined oil, or other oil products. A pictorial representation of a 
typical oil tanker is shown in Figure 5. 
.  
Oil Tanking Odfjell Terminal 
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Figure 5.   Pictorial representation of an oil tanker (From: [15]) 
As of January 2008, the largest oil tanker registered with Singapore is the crude 
oil tanker OCEAN JEWEL [16]. Table 3 provides a summary of OCEAN JEWEL’s 
details. Appendix B shows the complete vessel details maintained by the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) [17]. 
Table 3.   Summary of OCEAN JEWEL details (From: [17]) 
Vessel Type Crude Oil Tanker
Gross Tonnage (tons) 77,725 
Summer DWT (tons) 147,143 
Displacement (tons) 20,322 
Speed (kts) 15.0 
Length (m) 274 
Breadth (m) 43 
Depth (m) 24 
Crew 17 
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1.  Size  
There are 334 oil tankers registered with Singapore. Of those 334, only eight are 
over 48 kGT. The remaining 326 are all under 32 kGT. Figure 6 is a histogram of oil 
tankers registered with Singapore, showing that the preponderance of oil tankers are less 
than 32 kGT. Although few ships are comparable in size to the OCEAN JEWEL, it is 
selected for the DRM and further analysis because it represents a worst-case scenario. 
[16]  
 
Figure 6.   Oil tankers registered with Singapore (From: [16]) 
2.  Speed 
Traffic flow in the Strait of Malacca ranges from 14  25  to kts and oil tankers 
typically transit at 15  kts [18]. Whereas the IMO vessel data lists OCEAN JEWEL’s 
speed at 15 kts , it is not deemed the maximum possible speed. A typical transiting speed 
for merchant vessels is 15  kts for safe speed and fuel efficiency. For this DRM, the 
maximum possible speed is assumed to be 25  kts in a worst case scenario.  
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3.  Track 
The scenario defines the track (Figure 7) as starting in the Straight of Malacca and 
ending at Singapore’s Odfjell Terminal. All OPSITs run along the same track, but the 
starting point may vary. 
 
Figure 7.   The track of a SAW in Strait of Malacca to Singapore (From: [11]) 
E. DRM: OPERATIONAL SITUATIONS (OPSIT) 
1.  Introduction  
OPSITs are considered to be instances of a DRM in which the variables are 
attributes that make each OPSIT unique. The science and art of OPSIT development is 
similar to that of Testing and Evaluation (T&E) of major military systems. However, the 
process differs from T&E in that it can be as simple as formal “thought experiments.”  
In developing a set or family of OPSITs, a balance is struck between the average 
and extreme situations. The “average,” “most likely,” or “benign” situation serves as a 
quality starting point for a baseline OPSIT. From this OPSIT, it is possible to do the 
“partial differentiation” (changing selected variables/attributes) to develop families or 
arrays of OPSITs. The attributes of OPSITs, such at starting location and vessel speed, 
are selected and varied in a manner that facilitates risk and performance analysis. 
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2.  Assumptions 
Assumptions are made to simplify the scenario and keep variables manageable 
and to facilitate estimations when actual data is not available. Assumptions must be 
realistic to lend plausibility to OPSITs. In choosing assumptions, the OPSIT developer 
must choose variables intelligently and ask the fundamental question, “What do I want to 
learn?” from a given OPSIT. Wisely selected assumptions also help to control growth in 
the total number of OPSITs. An example of an assumption in this thesis is that all SAW 
events occur during the day and originate in the Strait of Malacca. However, subsequent 
studies could examine night time scenarios or where a SAW originates in the South 
China Sea. Following are the assumptions and basic DRM information. 
• Ship type: Crude Oil Tanker (OCEAN JEWEL) 
• Location at detection: Straight of Malacca 
• Target: Odfjell Terminal, Singapore 
• Time of Detection: 0900L 
• Speed at detection (SAD): Varies 
• Speed profile: Constant 
• Distance at detection (DAD): Varies 
• Track: As shown in Figure 7 
• Ship size; Constant 
• Terrorist desire to remain undetected 
• Terrorist are educated and will have maritime and navigation training 
• Flow of traffic 15  kts  
• Average weather conditions 
• Average maritime conditions 
• Unless otherwise stated, “distance” refers to distance along track  
• Detection occurs within geographic region along track from northwestern 
limit of Strait of Malacca to Odfjell Terminal.  
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3.  Characterization 
For initial top-level OPSIT generation in this work, the two main characteristics 
to change will be Distance-at-Detection (DAD) and Speed-at-detection (SAD). To 
generate an initial family of OPSITs, each characteristic is assigned a high (H), medium 
(M), and low (L) value based on the relative probability of occurrence and potential level 
of impact or difficulty. 
This assignment allows a manageable amount of OPSITs that sufficiently 
represent general situations. To characterize a particular OPSIT, a convention of 
OPSIT(DAD, SAD) will be used. For example, OPSIT(H, L) represents the OPSIT in 
which the SAW is detected near Singapore (high difficulty) transiting at a low speed (low 
difficulty). Table 4 shows the threat characteristics with associated difficulty level, value, 
and relative probability. 
To develop the DAD difficulty level, detection is assumed to occur within 450 
nautical miles (near the northeastern limit of the Strait of Malacca). The difficulty level is 
assigned by dividing this distance into thirds and designating the mean of each third as 
the respective value for the DAD’s difficulty level. The probability of detection along the 
track is assumed to be uniformly distributed. 
Table 4.   Postulated Threat Characteristics  
Characteristic Difficulty Level Value 
Relative Probability  
(H,M,L) 
H 75 nm M 
M 225 nm M Distance at Detection (DAD) 
L 375 nm M 
H 25  kts  M 
M 15  kts  H Speed at Detection (SAD) 
L 10  kts  L 
 
 16
Based on the typical observed rate of traffic flow in the Strait of Malacca, the 
medium difficulty level for the SAD is defined as 15  kts and has an associated high 
relative probability [18]. As terrorists are assumed to wish to remain undetected, it is 
unlikely that a SAW would deviate significantly from15  kts . Any large vessel transiting 
the straits at a speed of less than 10  kts would quickly attract unwanted attention. Thus, a 
speed of 10  kts is selected for a low level SAD with a low relative probability. Although 
some vessels transit the straits at 25  kts , terrorists presumably having a moderate 
amount of mariner proficiency would be less likely to transit at such a high speed because 
of the difficulties in collision avoidance, even though such a high speed would present a 
difficult situation for Singapore. Consequently, the relative probability of the SAW 
traveling at 25  kts is assigned a medium value. 
4.  OPSIT Selection 
Nine OPSITs result from combinations of the two DAD and SAD variables. 
OPSIT(M,M) is assumed as the baseline OPSIT and is not subject to further selection 
criteria. All DADs are equally likely to occur and all are therefore considered. Three 
OPSITs are withdrawn from consideration that have a low SAD, as they do not provide 
insight already provided by the other OPSITs.  
As Skolnick advises that OPSITs feature one or more stressing operational 
characteristics, only OPSITS that contain at least one variable “H” will be considered, 
since “H” is defined as a stressing condition [5]. The OPSIT list (Table 5) consists of the 
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III. NEEDS ANALYSIS 
A. BACKGROUND 
Needs Analysis is achieved by examining the threat, SAW, and establishing the 
needs of a SoS for stopping the SAW. The SoS is viewed as a counter-system to a SAW 
and is designated as an anti-SAW (ASAW) SoS. The needs of the ASAW SoS mirror the 
needs of the SAW. In order to develop MOEs, Technical Measures (TM) are identified 
and MOEs are selected from the TMs.  
B. SYSTEM OF SYSTEM NEEDS 
The fundamental mission of an ASAW SoS is to stop the SAW. The SAW is 
considered stopped when it no longer poses a threat to Singapore or its interests. When 
the SAW is stopped, a “mission kill” occurs and the SAW’s mission can no longer be 
achieved. In this thesis, the terms “kill” and “mission kill” are synonymous. [9] 
Any system designed to counter another system must interrupt at least one or 
more of the needs of the attacking system. Thus, the needs for any given countermeasure 
are readily defined since the needs of the attacking system are already well known. 
Figure 8 depicts the needs of a SAW the point of view of an ASAW SoS. Specifically, 
the SAW needs to be able to stay afloat provided by buoyancy, to be steerable, to have air 
flow to maintain power, to be able to maintain forward motion, and to be manned by 
personnel who must have visibility to navigate the SAW.  
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Figure 8.   Needs of a SAW (From: [15])  
Taking the converse of the SAW needs thus establishes the needs of an ASAW 
SoS. Every oil tanker need thus has a corresponding ASAW SoS need. The list of SAW 
needs (Table 6) serves as an initial list of “kill modes” by which a SAW can be defeated 
[9].  









C.  MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
1. Technical Measures 
The four categories of Technical Measures (TM) enumerated in Technical 
Measurement [8] are MOEs, MOPs, Technical Performance Measures (TPM), and Key 
Performance Parameter (KPP). They are often confused and not thoroughly understood. 
This thesis uses [8] as a guide for technical measures. Figure 9 shows the relationship 
between TMs. TPMs and KPPs are not used in this work but their definitions from [8] are 
included for completeness.  
 
 
Figure 9.   Relationships of the Technical Measures (From: [8]) 
• MOEs are “operational” measures of success closely related to the 
achievement of mission or operational objectives; i.e., they provide insight 
into the accomplishment of the mission needs independent of the chosen 
solution. 
• MOPs characterize the physical or functional attributes relating to the 






• TPMs measure attributes of a system element within the system to 
determine how well the system or system element is satisfying specified 
requirements. 
• KPPs are a critical subset of the performance parameters representing the 
most critical capabilities and characteristics. 
2. Potential Technical Measures  
The TMs include any parameters that provide value in the assessment of 
alternatives and the overarching systems engineering process [8]. The first step in 
generating TMs will be to examine the “kill tree” discussed in [9]. Appendix C shows the 
kill tree in its entirety. The kill tree gives probabilities of occurrence for particular events. 
These probabilities are adopted as TMs. Each event is defined in Table 7 and listed in 
Table 8. 
Table 7.   Kill tree event definitions. 
Event Description 
A Active weapon. Hijacking with intent to collide has occurred. 
D Detection. Authorities have confirmation of SAW. 
L Launch. ASAW has been activated. 
I Intercept. ASAW is within an engagement envelope as defined system.
H Hit. Predefined interaction between SAW and ASAW occurs. 
K Kill. (SAW has been neutralized) 
 
The progression of events in the kill tree gives time and distance intervals. These 
variables are also used as TMs. Figure 10 shows the progression of scenario events from 
left to right, starting with the occurrence of a hijacking, event A, and ending with a SAW 
mission kill, event K. The analysis starts at event D, a confirmed detection of a SAW.  
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Figure 10.   Progression of scenario events 
The time elapsed and the distance between two events X and Y are denoted by 
XYt  and XYd  respectively. Let KD  be the distance along the track from the Odfjell 
Terminal to the SAW when it is killed, and KT  the time of the SAW kill. Then they can 
be computed according to Equations 3.1 and 3.2. Table 8 shows the list of TMs generated 
from the kill tree.  
       K DL LI IH HKT t t t t= + + +  (3.1) 
 
         K DL LI IH HKD d d d d= + + +  (3.2) 
Table 8.   List of Technical Measures 
Technical Measures 
PK TK DK 
PH tHK dHK 
PI tIH dIH 
PL tLI dLI 
PD tDL dDL 
PA tAD dAD 
3. ASAW Measures of Effectiveness 
The probability of kill, KP , the chosen MOE, is a measure of an ASAW mission 
success (i.e., achieving SAW mission kill). 
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IV. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS  
A. BACKGROUND 
Requirements Analysis is dependent on Needs Analysis and contains Operational 
Requirements Analysis, Functional Analysis, and Non-functional Analysis. The primary 
outputs of Requirements Analysis are the subsequent requirements and MOPs.  
B. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS  
The operational requirements are derived directly from the Problem Statement 
and the top-level need to stop a hijacked oil tanker or to stop the OCEAN JEWEL 
transiting at 25  kts is viewed as a worst-case scenario.  
As an operational requirement, the OCEAN JEWEL (SAW) must be stopped 
before it reaches the Jurong oil terminal. The goal is to stop the SAW in the Straits of 
Malacca and Singapore before it gets to the approaches to Singapore. 
C. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS  
Functional Analysis involves identifying the top-level functions of the ASAW 
SoS and performing functional decomposition captured in a functional requirements 
diagram.  
1. Functional Requirements 
Most top-level functional requirements for the ASAW SoS are developed by with 
the aide of the use cases as suggested by Bruegge and Dutoit [19]. A use case expresses 
what a given system is doing from a given perspective at any given time. A complete set 
of use cases captures all possibilities of what a system should do. The use case method of 
requirements development views a given system as a “black box” depicting the actors, 
the system, system functions expressed as use cases and interactions between actors and 
use cases. [19]  
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Table 9 shows the process for crafting the initial list of ASAW FoS functional 
requirements and how they evolve, originating with oil tanker (SAW) needs. With the oil 
tanker needs and corresponding opposing needs for an ASAW SoS, the ASAW use cases 
are derived. The use cases are then mapped directly to the functional requirements.  
Table 9.   Functional Requirements development process 
 
 








Air Flow Interrupt Air Flow  Interrupt Air Flow Interrupt Air Flow 
Personnel Degrade Personnel Degrade Personnel Degrade Personnel 
Visibility Degrade Visibility Degrade Visibility Degrade Visibility 
Forward Motion  Impede Motion Impede Motion Impede Motion 
Buoyancy Change Buoyancy Change Buoyancy Change Buoyancy 
Steering Impede Steering Impede Steering Impede Steering 
 
The resulting functional requirements are for the ASAW FoS. An ASAW SoS 
also needs to perform the C3 which is not shown in Table 9. The use case diagram in 
Figure 11 depicts the functional requirements, which include the C3 function, for an 
ASAW SoS. This view has two actors and one SoS. It is the FoS that interacts with the 
SAW. Table 10 also shows the functional requirements. 
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Figure 11.   ASAW use case diagram 
Table 10.   ASAW SoS functional requirements 
Functional 
Requirements 








2. Functional Decomposition 
The SysML functional requirements diagram Figure 12 captures the functional 
decomposition. In addition to the sub-functions carried out to effect the corresponding 
top-level functions, the communicate sub-function allows for command and control by 
the C3 function.  
 























































Figure 12.   ASAW functional requirements diagram 
D. NON-FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
The use case method is not appropriate for capturing non-functional requirements 
(NFR). NFRs may be referred to as “quality attributes” since they indicate how well a 
system performs its job.  
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The NFRs are data requirements, constraints, and quality requirements which 
relate directly to the ability of an ASAW SoS to stop a SAW [20]. The data and 
constraint requirements are obtained analytically using the fundamental laws of physics 
and available information. Focus is on the NFRs for the FoS, not the C3 function, as they 
relate to the functions required of the systems of the FoS that execute the stopping-the-
SAW action.  
1.  Interrupt Air Flow 
Interruption of the air flow of a SAW must consider intake/exhaust diameters, 
locations and required volumetric flow rates. There is no anti-ship system known to the 
author designed to deny air for combustion to ships or to clog exhaust ducts. This could 
be an effective “soft kill” method and may warrant further study for military use.  
To illustrate this concept, a system reduces the intake air flow of a SAW to 
subsequently reduce its main engine power. The volumetric flow rate, inQ , is given by 
 in in inQ A v=  (4.1) 
where inA  is the area of the intake duct and inv  is the speed of the intake air entering the 
duct. As inQ  is reduced, a certain decrease in engine power and speed is realized. When 
inQ  becomes sufficiently low, the internal combustion of the engines cannot be sustained, 
and the SAW will eventually stop moving.  
Based on the specifications of the Pielstick 4.2/2V engine, a linear airflow-to-
horsepower ratio of 2.6 in the region of high power [21], and an estimated maximum 
horsepower of the OCEAN JEWEL at 28,000  HP [22], the maximum volumetric flow 
of approximately 72,800 cubic feet per minute ( ) CFM is obtained. An air flow 
interrupting system would need to reduce this maximum volumetric intake flow. 
2.  Degrade Personnel 
The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reports indicate that the size of typical 
pirate teams range from two to fourteen [23]. Teams of 2-3 are on the low end and 10-15 
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on the high end, but usually teams of 5-6 pirates are used [23]. These numbers are used to 
gain insight into the number of terrorists required to commandeer a large merchant 
vessel. 
Pirates are not as concerned about the crew working in the engineering spaces as 
hijackers would have to be in order to subdue all crewmembers and overtake their duties. 
Pirate teams vary mostly between 5 and 10 people when only cargo ships and tankers are 
considered [23]. Since hijacking and piloting a ship is more complicated than subduing 
and stealing from a ship, a team size range of 5-10 represents the minimum required by a 
terrorist team to execute a SAW mission.  
3. Degrade Visibility 
Degrade Visibility refers to diminishing the line-of-sight visibility of the human 
eye. Human visibility is subjective, but meteorological range is not and is expressed by 
Koschmieder’s formula (Equation 4.2),  
 1 1 3.912lnV = =α ε α , (4.2) 
 
where V  is the range, α  is the extinction coefficient (at 0.55 mμ  wavelength), and ε  is 
the threshold contrast for detection assumed to be 0.02 [24].  
Artificial obscurants may be utilized to deny a SAW’s visibility of the entrance to 
the harbor from the straits or to deny visibility of the oil terminal itself. To this end, as the 
SAW gets closer to the harbor entrance, means can be used to increase the value of α  
and thereby reduce visibility.  
4. Impede Motion 
Impede Motion refers to degrading the forward axial motion of the SAW and not 
the ability to steer, which is addressed separately. Any system designed to block or 




Sufficient counter thrust or physical degradation of the propeller must 
exist to deny a ship its propulsion. For an opposing thrust to be effective, the maximum 
forward thrust of the SAW, maxT , must be known. Let maxP  be the maximum power of the 
main engines and maxv  the maximum speed of the SAW. Then maxT  is given by 
 max max maxP T v= . (4.3) 
With the maximum power of ( )28,000  21 HP MW  and the maximum speed 
of ( )25  12.9 /kts m s , it follows from Equation 4.3 that the maximum forward thrust for 
the OCEAN JEWEL is 61.6 10 N× . 
b. Path 
Let maxp  be the maximum momentum, maxm  the maximum mass, and maxv  
the maximum speed, and maxK  is the maximum kinetic energy. Then, for the OCEAN 
JEWEL, whose mass is 167,465,000  kg [17], its maxp  and maxK  are approximately 
92.1 10 kg m s× ⋅  and 101.37 10 J×  according to Equations 4.4 and 4.5, respectively.  
 max max maxp m v=  (4.4) 
 
 2max max max
1
2
K m v=    (4.5) 
If a barrier is to be constructed at the mouth of the harbor, then one 
measure of its effectiveness will be the amount the energy it can absorb without failing, 
assuming a SAW runs directly into it.  
5. Change Buoyancy 
Change Buoyancy pertains to decreasing the “effective buoyancy” of the ocean 
water. For a floating vessel, the net vertical force acting on it is zero. To make the net 
force on it non-zero, the density of the water, seawaterρ , must be reduced significantly 
compared to the density of the SAW, SAWρ . If seawaterρ is less than SAWρ , the SAW will 
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lose its buoyancy. With the maximum volume of the OCEAN JEWEL, maxV , being 
3219,962  m [17], the density of the OCEAN JEWEL at maximum oil capacity 






ρ = . (4.6) 
This method would only be effective for actually sinking or damaging a ship, 
which is not necessarily desired. It can be achieved by placing pipes on the ocean floor to 
release gas to aerate the water, and thereby, effectively reducing the density of the ocean 
water.  
6.  Impede Steering 
Sufficient counter torque or physical degradation of the rudder must exist to deny 
a ship its ability to steer. For an opposing torque to be effective, the maximum turning 
torque, maxτ , must be known. Let Yδ  be the rudder angle coefficient, maxRδ  the maximum 
rudder angle (30o), maxRF  the maximum perpendicular turning force resulting from the 
maximum rudder deflection, and Rr  the distance from the pivot to the rudder (Figure 13). 
The maximum torque, maxτ , is given by  
 max max maxR R R RF r Y r= = δτ δ  [25]. (4.7) 
 
Figure 13.   Rudder force diagram (From: [25]) 
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Imagine a high speed tug boat that applies sufficient counter torque to deny the 
SAW its steering ability. If this tug is to simply prevent the SAW from steering (keep it 
going straight), then it must be able to match maxτ of the SAW. An applied torque less 
than maxτ degrades the ability of the SAW to steer, and any torque greater than maxτ  has a 
“redirecting ability.”  
E.  MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE  
1. Selecting and Specifying MOPs 
Again, the mission of the ASAW SoS is to stop the SAW and to stop it as early 
and distant from Singapore as possible. The time from confirmation of a SAW to the time 
of mission kill, KT , and the distance along its track from the Jurong Oil Terminal to the 
location where the SAW mission kill occurs, KD , are selected as MOPs. Table 11 
captures the MOE and MOPs.  
Table 11.   Table of MOE and MOPs 
Technical Measure Variable Description 
MOE-1 PK  Probability of mission kill 
MOP-1 TK  Time from confirmation to time of mission kill 
MOP-2  DK  Distance along track from target to location of kill 
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V. SYSTEM OF SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE ALTERNATIVES 
An ASAW SoS makes use of existing and future systems in the FoS. The existing 
systems are those systems or platforms that may or may not be currently used for 
Maritime Domain Protection (MDP), may need some modifications, and are considered 
to have a relatively high TRL. The future systems pertain to those that exist only as 
concepts or require major modifications or development before they can perform the 
ASAW mission or any other MDP mission. The future systems tend to have a low TRL. 
As the focus of this thesis is on the FoS, C3 structures are assumed to exist. An 
ASAW SoS will consist of elements from the FoS and the C3 structures.  
A. IDENTIFICATION OF ELEMENTS  
1. Existing Systems  
a. Sea Marshals 
Sea Marshals are a proactive and reactive system and perform the Degrade 
Personnel function. When performing reactively, they serve as a quick reaction force 
(QRF) that can be either waterborne or airborne. [2]  
b. Warships 
Generically, warships can provide many different functions as part of a 
larger ASAW system such as Interrupt Air Flow, Degrade Personnel, Impede Motion, 
Change Buoyancy, and Impede Steering. Warships are considered any waterborne vessel 
designed for military or law enforcement purposes. The mechanisms by which a warship 
achieves these functions may not be acceptable in that they result in undesired impacts to 
the environment and maritime traffic if oil is spilled or the SAW is sunk in a traffic lane. 
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c. Tugs 
Tugs would carry out Impede Motion and Impede Steering, but traditional 
working tugs may not have the required speed. Schottle, a German based company, has 
designed a high-speed bridge erection vessel shown in Figure 14 [26]. Appendix D 
presents excerpts from Schottle’s product information sheet. Whereas no high-speed tug 
is known to exist, the technology required for developing one is considered proven. 
 
 
Figure 14.   Schottle Bridge Erection Boat Type MB (From: [26]) 
d.  Aircraft 
Similar to warships, fixed wing and rotary aircraft can provide many 
different functions such as Interrupt Air Flow, Degrade Personnel, Impede Motion, 
Change Buoyancy, and Impede Steering. Again, the mechanisms by which these are 
achieved may not be acceptable for the same reasons mentioned in the discussion of 
warships. 
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e. Physical Barrier  
No known physical barrier designed for the purpose of stopping a SAW 
exists. However, the flood gate in the New Waterway to Rotterdam (Figure 15) 
demonstrates that a large scale barrier blocking the approaches to Singapore could 
achieve the Impede Motion function effectively for a massive ship like the OCEAN 
JEWELL. 
 
Figure 15.   Flood gate in the New Waterway to Rotterdam (From: [27]) 
f. Artificial Obscurants 
The military has designed artificial obscurants to deny the enemy full 
visibility of forces [24]. By fulfilling the Reduce Visibility function, a system of artificial 
obscurants could be employed to deny the terrorists piloting a SAW full visibility of the 
approaches to Singapore, thereby reducing the probability that the SAW could reach its 
intended target. 
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2. Postulated Systems  
a.  Standing Water Wave 
The system concept to generate a standing water wave that deflects or 
redirect a waterborne craft is based on [28]. This concept can be effective in carrying out 
the Impede Motion and Impede Steering functions. Intuitively, a standing water wave 
system would be much more effective against smaller vessels not typical of a SAW. It 
could prove effectual in a counter Small Boat Attack (SBA) mission. In this case, it could 
perform the Degrade Personnel function if terrorists on a small boat encounter it at high 
speeds. This kind of system can be advantageous because it could be activated quickly 
upon the push of a button when the time to react is short.  
b. Bubbling System  
Fundamentally, this idea stems from the theory that the release of massive 
amounts of methane in the Bermuda Triangle may have contributed to the loss of some of 
the aircraft and ships [29]. Laboratory experiments have shown that continuous rising of 
small bubbles in water can sink floating objects [30] and such potential exists for military 
applications [29].  
A potential system based on this concept might consists of an array of 
pipes or some other mechanism for releasing large amounts of gas over a large area. The 
bubbles of gas effectively reduce the density of the seawater and satisfy the Change 
Buoyancy function. 
c. Unmanned Underwater Vehicle 
Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV) similar to those shown in Figure 
16, developed by International Submarine Engineering [31], could be designed and 
programmed to foul the propeller or steering gear. Fouling the propeller or steering gear 
would perform the Impede Motion or Impede Steering functions. UUVs for this purpose 
are considered postulated systems because of the amount of development required to 
perform needed functions. 
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Figure 16.   International Submarine Engineering UUVs (From: [31]) 
d. Air Flow Interrupter 
An air flow interrupting system could be delivered with a guided weapon. 
An air flow interrupter could prove useful as a “non lethal” weapon since it is designed to 
deny sufficient main engine air intake or exhaust and the loss of human life would be 
unlikely. If intake air is on the side of the ship, then an air interrupting systems may be a 
man-portable or crew-served weapon deployed by a reaction force from a small boat.  
B. FUNCTIONAL EMBEDDING 
Functional Embedding allocates functions to elements (systems) comprising the 
ASAW SoS. Table 12 shows the functions performed by each existing and postulated 
system. The number of functions embedded per system is not a means to assess a 
system’s performance. With the exception of the C3 function, functional embedding 






Table 12.   Functional Embedding 
  Functions  
 































































 X     X 
Warship X X  X X X X 
Tug    X  X X 
Aircraft X X  X X X X 
Physical Barrier    X   X 
Artificial 
Obscurant   X    X 
Standing Water 
Wave    X  X X 
Bubbling System     X  X 
UUV    X  X X 
Air Flow 
Interrupter X      X 
 
C. SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS COMPOSITION OPTIONS 
SoS composition options are divided into existing and postulated options. The 
existing systems currently used as part of Singapore’s MDP (Sea Marshals, warships, and 
aircraft) [2] are assumed remain in any existing force composition option. Therefore, all 
option variations involve combinations of tugs, barriers, and obscurants. Table 13 shows 
each option and its component systems where each option is indexed E-1 through E-8.  
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Table 13.    Existing ASAW SoS composition options 
  Option 
  


























Marshals X X X X X X X X 
Warships X X X X X X X X 
Aircraft X X X X X X X X 
Tugs  X     X  X X 
Physical 
Barrier    X    X X   X 
Artificial 
Obscurants      X   X X X 
 
Postulated composition options may include existing systems and postulated 
systems. All existing systems are assumed to be included in all postulated composition 
options. All variations are combinations of standing water wave, bubbling system, UUV, 
and air flow interrupter. Table 14 shows all postulated ASAW FoS composition options 











Table 14.   Postulated ASAW FoS composition options 
  Option 
  

















































Sea Marshals X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Warships X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Aircraft X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Tugs X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Physical 
Barrier X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Artificial 
Obscurants X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Standing 
Water Wave  X    X X X    X X X   X 
Bubbling 
System   X   X   X X  X X   X X 
UUVs    X   X  X  X X   X X X 
Air Flow 
Interrupter     X   X  X X  X X X X 
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VI. RISK ANALYSIS 
A. BACKGROUND 
Cost, schedule, and performance are the fundamental constraints in a program to 
develop a system. Any risks are ultimately related to at least one of these three 
constraints. In this work, Risk Analysis identifies schedule and performance risk by 
investigating technology risk and the TMs associated with each system in the FoS. The 
insight gained facilitates the ranking of the ASAW SoS architectures. 
B. TECHNOLOGY RISK 
In the DoD, Technology Readiness Assessments help to identify technology risk 
and serve as an aid to decision making in systems acquisition [10]. Identification of 
technology risk allows for a better understanding of both schedule and performance risk 
since it provides information on how well a certain system, technology, or concept is 
developed. If it is not mature or proven, then it is more likely to take a long time 
(schedule risk) to develop before it can meet functional requirements (technology risk). 
To evaluate the technology risk for each existing and postulated system, each is 
scored using the DoD Hardware Technology Readiness Level definitions (Appendix E) 
[10]. Table 15 shows scorings for the respective systems. 
Table 15.   Technology Readiness Level scores 
Existing systems TRL Postulated systems TRL 
Sea Marshals 9 Standing Water Wave 1 
Warships 9 Bubbling System 3 
Aircraft  9 UUVs 3 
Tugs 7-8 Air Flow Interrupter 1 
Physical Barrier 7-8 --  
Artificial Obscurants 7-8 --  
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C. PERFORMANCE RISK 
Identification of performance risk for each existing and postulated system is 
discussed based how each is or may be employed. Performance risks are assessed 
qualitatively by examining the MOE and MOPs, and where appropriate, the relative 
performance of the systems in the FoS is discussed. Impacts by these systems as they 
carry on their mission on the environment and shipping are not considered.  
1. Sea Marshals 
Sea Marshals are considered well trained, good at what they do, and a reliable 
“system” for defeating a SAW. Risk to KP  is thus low. The speed of sea and air platforms 
for Sea Marshals is an advantage. Risk is therefore related to the time from SAW 
confirmation to when marshals embark on a platform. The range at which Sea Marshals 
can be deployed is not a limiting factor. The risk in range exists only when a SAW is 
confirmed to be near Singapore as marshal teams may not be able to embark on their 
platforms quickly enough to execute their mission. Therefore, the risks in KT  and KD  are 
scenario dependant, increasing as the SAW speed increases and distance to the SAW at 
conformation decreases. 
2. Warships 
Warships are fully capable of stopping surface vessels. However, there are 
performance risks associated with each warship depending on its weapon systems. Thus, 
risk to KP  varies with the combat systems suite of a given ship. Since warships can transit 
as fast or faster than merchant vessels there is no risk in the warship’s speed. The range 
of warships is also not a limiting factor and their time to intercept is dependent on the 
location and speed of the SAW. Again, the risks to KT  and KD  increase as SAW speed 
increases and distance to the SAW decreases. 
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3. Aircraft  
Similar to warships, an aircraft’s capability is dependent on its suite of weapons, 
and risk is therefore platform specific. Range and speed are not risks but advantages for 
aircraft. Limitations exist in the time from SAW notification to activation since it would 
take time for a crew and pilot to become airborne. All risk relationships are the same as 
those from warships.  
4. Tugs 
Risk to KP  is significant since tugs employed against a SAW may not fully 
achieve a mission kill but could prove effective in at least reducing a SAW’s probability 
of success or mitigating its impact. Also, tugs are not designed to move non-cooperative 
vessels at transit speeds and may not have the required maneuverability. Traditional tugs 
are not designed for speed and are not on patrol in the straits. Risks to KT  and KD  exist 
because a tug’s range is limited and crews would need time to get underway upon 
notification and may not be able to reach the SAW in time. 
5. Physical Barrier 
A physical barrier would be effective and there carries very little risk to KP . A 
physical barriers performance is limited by the size of the ship it can stop or slow down. 
It is not feasible for a barrier system to be placed in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore 
and are therefore their use would be confined to the approaches to Singapore. A potential 
advantage of a barrier is its reaction time since it could be activated immediately upon 
SAW confirmation. The risk would exist in the time it takes to close because such a large 
system is expected to take tens of minutes to completely shut. Therefore there are 
negligible risks in KT  and KD . 
6. Artificial Obscurants 
Artificial Obscurants would unlikely be an effective means of stopping a SAW 
but they could make navigation of the SAW difficult for the terrorists, thereby reducing 
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the probability that the SAW reaches the oil terminal. Risk also exists in that obscurants, 
dependent on prevailing winds at the time and location of deployment, may not achieve 
the required reduction in visibility. An advantage of obscurants, however, can be quickly 
activated and deployed from several locations. Risk to KP  is therefore significant and 
risks to KT  and KD  are relatively low.  
7. Standing Water Wave 
As previously discussed, performance risk of an ASAW system increases with the 
size of the SAW. It could be deployed anywhere along the ocean floor. The rate at which 
a standing wave generating system can be activated is expected to be near instantaneous, 
minimizing reaction time. Risk to KP  of such a system is difficult to assess. If this system 
were deployed, risks to KT  and KD  would be negligible.  
8. Bubbling System 
Similar to the standing water wave, risk increases as the size of the ship increases, 
specifically as the length and width of the ship increases. As the length and width of the 
SAW increases the area required for the bubbling system increases. There is little risk in 
where it can be used. The rate at which a bubbling system can be activated could be 
almost instantaneous. As with many postulated system risk to KP  is difficult to evaluate 
but risks to KT  and KD  are small. 
9. Unmanned Underwater Vehicles 
Risk in KP  exists in the ability of a UUV to search, track, and home-in on a SAW. 
It also exists in the ability of a UUV to foul the rudder or propeller. UUVs carry the same 
time and distance risks as do surface vessels. Risk is reduced as their speed and range is 
increased. Unlike manned vessels, time from SAW confirmation to being underway can 
be much shorter. 
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10. Air Flow Interrupter 
The effectiveness of an air flow interrupter is dependent on the amount by which 
it can reduce air flow, intake or exhaust. There is risk associated with the ability to get an 
air interrupting apparatus in the proper location, which is also limited by the duration of 
time that it is able to keep the flow at low levels. Risk is also associated with its range 
and speed, and, it would be dependent on the launch platform location. However, an 
advantage is that air flow interrupters could be deployed by land, air, or sea based 
launching systems. The amount of risk to KP  is largely dependant on its delivery system 
and since guided weapons are reliable the risk to KP  is comparable to other postulated 
systems but the risks to KT  and KD  are low. 
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VII. SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE RANKING 
Existing and postulated ASAW SoS architecture options are ranked separately. 
Rankings are based on risk (Chapter VI). Priorities and assumptions are discussed as the 
options are weighed against each other.  
Recall that each ASAW SoS architecture option in Tables 13 and 14 in Chapter V 
is made up of the systems drawn from the FoS. Again, as the C3 structures remain 
unchanged across the ASAW SoS architecture options, ranking the ASAW SoS 
architecture options amounts to ranking the options described in Chapter V.  
A. EXISTING SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS RANKING 
Options with the most systems are taken to be the best options if their component 
systems are equal. Adding any system to the ASAW SoS presumably makes the ASAW 
SoS better in all instances. The option with the most systems, E-8, is therefore ranked 
highest.  
Since the TRLs are identical for tugs, barriers and obscurants, the differentiating 
factor among the three is their performance risk. Based on performance risk, barriers, 
tugs, and obscurants are ranked according to the order of appearance, which is the 
descending order of priority. Table 16 shows the ranking of the existing ASAW SoS 
architecture options corresponding to the respective compositions (E-1 through E-8). 
Table 16.   Existing FoS Ranking 











B. POSTULATED SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS RANKING 
Option P-17 has the most systems and is, therefore, preferred. Since the bubbling 
system and UUVs have equivalent TRLs and are not distinguished by their performance 
risk, they are considered equivalent in ranking. The standing water wave and air flow 
interrupter also have equivalent TRLs; however, the standing water wave would be less 
effective against a SAW, so the air flow interrupter ranks higher than the standing water 
wave. Table 17 captures the ranking of the postulate systems, predicated on, again, the 
presumption that adding any system to the ASAW SoS makes the ASAW SoS better in 
all instances. 
Table 17.   Postulated FoS Ranking 
Rank Option Rank Option 
1 P-17 9 P-6 
2 P-15 9 P-7 
3 P-12 11 P-8 
4 P-13 12 P-3 
4 P-14 12 P-4 
6 P-9 14 P-5 
7 P-10 15 P-2 
7 P-11 16 P-1 
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VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Terrorists have demonstrated their intent and capability to execute attacks on oil 
related infrastructure. Singapore is considered an attractive target for such attacks, 
because of its coastal oil infrastructure, high throughput of oil, high traffic density of 
merchant ships transiting the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, and high potential for a 
large economic impact if the oil flow and maritime trade are interrupted. 
This type of threat, known as a ship used as a weapon (SAW), was addressed in 
Maritime Domain Protection in the Straits of Malacca [2] by NPS’s Systems Engineering 
and Analysis (SEA) Cohort 7 (SEA-7) in June 2005 and in Maritime Threat Response [4] 
by SEA-9 in June 2006. SEA-7 focused on an SoS for cargo container inspections and a 
total maritime inspection subsystem to detect and identify dangerous materials [2]. SEA-
9 focused on an SoS to respond to maritime threats such as weapon of mass destructive 
on a ship, a SAW, and small boat attacks in San Francisco Bay [3]. Recently, the 
Temasek Defence Systems Institute (TDSI) raised this SAW problem at the TDSI-NPS 
conferences June 2007 and sought its solutions [4]. 
This thesis examines the modes-of-defeat for a SAW and develops conceptual 
systems, concepts, or methods as part of a family of systems (FoS) that can be employed 
in a system of systems SoS to stop an oil tanker used as a weapon. The SoS is designated 
as the anti-SAW (ASAW) SoS. The specific scenario, established with the aid of the 
DRM analysis performed in this thesis, involves the largest oil tanker traveling at 25 kts 
and aiming to collide with the Jurong Oil Terminal in Singapore Harbor. .  
The approach to determining architecture alternatives of the ASAW SoS 
leverages the System of Systems Architecture Development Process (SoSADP) [1]. It is 
set in motion by the SAW problem and ends with architecture alternatives of the ASAW 
SoS. The systems of the ASAW SoS are drawn from the FoS. The members of this FoS 
have one function in common – that is stop a SAW, and they can be current and future 
systems and concepts. As the C3 structure remains fixed for all SoS architecture 
alternatives, the focus of this thesis is on the members of the FoS.  
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The probability mission of kill, KP , is the MOE. The time from confirmation of a 
SAW to the time of mission kill, KT , and the distance along its projected track from the 
Jurong Oil Terminal to the location where the SAW mission kill occurs, KD , are the 
MOPs. Selection of systems and the subsequent ranking of options depend on the MOE 
and MOPs. 
The members of the FoS carry out these functions: Interrupt Air Flow, Degrade 
Personnel, Degrade Visibility, Impede Motion, Change Buoyancy, and Impede Steering. 
The resulting ASAW SoS architecture alternatives have both existing and postulated 
systems in the FoS. The existing systems include Sea Marshals, warships, aircraft, tugs, 
physical barriers, and artificial obscurants. The postulated systems are standing water 
waves, bubbling system, UUV, and air flow interrupter.  
Technology and performance risks of component systems in an ASAW SoS form 
the basis for ranking the options. Technology risk identification scores each existing and 
postulated system based on DoD TRL definitions. Performance risk identification 
examines the MOE and MOPs, and where appropriate, the relative performance of the 
systems in the SoS. The evaluation of each system’s technology and performance risks 
result in rankings of SoSs composed of those sytems. The rankings are not to be taken as 
an absolute order of priority but rather as a basis upon which courses of action for 
defeating a SAW and enhancing MDP are formulated. 
The results generated by the SoSADP in this thesis can be applied not only to the 
ASAW mission problem but also to other MDP missions. Whereas the setting of the 
ASAW scenario is Singapore, the methods and solutions formulated in this thesis could 
apply to other crucial ports and shorelines around the world. Employing these solutions 
could negate such an attack, thereby protecting critical coastal infrastructure. Providing 
this protection would help maintain economic and political stability.  
There is potential for near-term improvement of the existing options. It is 
recommended that continued analysis be conducted for high speed tugs, barriers, and 
obscurants for evaluating their integration into the current MDP SoS. Further analysis is 
also required and suggested for the postulated options. By their nature, postulated 
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systems require extensive research and development. Additional study and research are 
strongly recommended on existing and postulated systems for any nation where a SAW 
has been determined to be a significant threat. Finally, any future studies should extend 
beyond the SAW problem and include the overall MDP mission. 
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APPENDIX D.  SCHOTTLE BRIDGE ERECTION BOAT [26] 
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